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  CIRANO
Cet article étudie l'abus d'autorité dans une hiérarchie principal-
superviseur-agent avec risque moral. Dans une telle structure, le superviseur dont
le rôle consiste à faire un rapport sur le niveau d'effort de l'agent, peut abuser de son
autorité en exerçant un chantage sur son subordonné. Lorsque le superviseur
observe que l'agent a fourni le niveau d'effort désiré par le principal, il peut menacer
l'agent d'un faux rapport dans lequel il signale n'avoir rien observé. Afin d'empêcher
une telle menace, l'agent peut avoir intérêt à accepter le chantage du superviseur en
lui versant un tribut. On étudie les contrats optimaux dans une telle structure
hiérarchique. On montre qu'il est optimal pour le principal d'offrir des contrats qui
empêchent l'abus d'autorité. Ces contrats détruisent l'enjeu du chantage en
augmentant l'espérance de gain de l'agent. Ce résultat est surprenant car,
paradoxalement, la possibilité d'abus d'autorité dans l'organisation profite
finalement à la victime (l'agent) et non à l'instigateur (le superviseur).
This paper analyzes abuse of authority in a principal-supervisor-agent
hierarchy under moral hazard. We characterize the optimal contracts when the
supervisor takes advantage of his authority by blackmailing the agent. We show
that the optimal policy for the principal is to deter abuse of authority. We find that,
paradoxically, the existence of abuse of authority in hierarchies benefits in fine the
victim (the agent) and not the instigator (the supervisor). Our analysis also reveals
that the existence of abuse of authority in organizations expands the range of
contractual incompleteness.
Mots Clés : Contrats, risque moral, abus d'autorité, chantage, hiérarchie,
contrats incomplets
Keywords : Agency, moral hazard, abuse of authority, blackmail, hierarchy,
incomplete contracts
JEL : D82, L20, M12
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
In agency models contracts are conditioned by unocial activities of the
agents. Recently, the basic agency model has been extended to account
for more complex unocial activities. Among these activities are col-
lusion (Tirole (1986, 1992), Laont and Tirole (1993)), hidden games
(Laont (1988, 1990)), inuence activities (Milgrom (1988)), sabotage
(Lazear (1989)), employee crime (Dickens and al. (1989)), conformism
(Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), conservatism (Zwiebel (1995)) and fa-
voritism (Prendergast and Topel (1996)). While some of these unocial
activities may exist in a principal-agent relationship, others are specic
to a multi-level principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy. When a principal
employs a supervisor to obtain and report information about an agent,
she may be exposed to two main forms of unocial activities. The
supervisor and the agent may play against the principal by colluding.
The supervisor may also blackmail the agent. Since Tirole's (1986) in-
uential paper, collusion has become the focus of a growing literature.
Collusion refers to situations when the supervisor and the agent agree to
form a coalition which is detrimental to the principal. The agent then
pays the supervisor to conceal unfavorable information. Thus, collusion
is a mutually advantageous agreement between the supervisor and the
agent. In contrast to collusion, the abuse of authority in organizations
remains, theoretically, almost unexplored. The aim of this paper is to
take a step towards analyzing this issue. We characterize the design of
optimal contracts when the supervisor takes advantage of his authority
by blackmailing the agent. In our hierarchical model, the agent (she)
has the choice between working or shirking. The principal (she) must
therefore give an incentive to the agent to induce her to work. Given that
the outcome of this hierarchical relationship is assumed to be revealed
in the long run, contracts are contingent only on the supervisor's report
on the agent's eort level. The information transmitted by the supervi-
sor (he) to the principal is considered to be hard evidence. Therefore,
the only way to manipulate information is to conceal it. As we assume
that the supervision technology is imperfect, there is a probability that
the supervisor will not observe the agent's eort level. The supervi-
sor has then discretion to conceal information by pretending that he
has observed nothing. In this context, we refer to blackmail as situa-
tions when the supervisor observes that the agent works but threatens
the agent with concealing this information. Accordingly, in the case of
blackmail, the supervisor threatens the agent with concealing favorable
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information, that is, information that the agent would like the supervi-
sor to accurately report. Unlike collusion, blackmail is not a collective
(supervisor-agent coalition) form of unocial activity and, therefore it
is not mutually protable. When blackmailing the agent, the supervi-
sor manipulates information to the detriment of the entire organization.
The major result of this paper is related to the highly imperfect super-
vision technology case. That is, when there is a low probability that
the supervisor observes the agent's eort level. In this case, we show
that when the supervisor is truthful, the agent receives three dierent
wages contingent on the supervisor's report on her eort. The principal
uses all of the supervisor's information to remunerate the agent. As the
supervisor's report becomes more favorable, the agent's wage increases.
The agent receives the highest wage when the supervisor reports that
she has worked. Next, we consider the case of a venal supervisor who
takes advantage of his authority by blackmailing the agent. We show
that the optimal policy for the principal is to deter blackmail. However,
unlike in the case of collusion, to deter blackmail, the principal has not
the choice between designing incentive payments for the supervisor and
reducing his discretion. The only available policy against blackmail is
to reduce the supervisor's authority over the agent. This means that
blackmail can only be deterred by destroying its stake. This is done
by ignoring available information provided by the supervisor. The prin-
cipal then uses aggregate information to pay the agent. Formally, the
supervisor's authority is reduced through the destruction of the stake
of blackmail, by raising the agent's contingent wage connected with an
uninformative report. The agent is then oered the same wage as the
one which was contingent on the most favorable report in the truthful
supervisor case whether the supervisor's report shows that the agent
has worked or whether the report is uninformative. Therefore, when
blackmail occurs, the agent is the one who gets the informational rent
connected with blackmail. This means that the existence of blackmail
in hierarchies benets in ne the victim (the agent) and not the insti-
gator (the supervisor). We refer to this phenomenon as the \blackmail
paradox" in hierarchies. Despite the fact that the supervisor may al-
ways successfully blackmail the agent in multi-level hierarchy models,
extortion and blackmail have not received much attention from agency
theorists (e.g., Tirole, 1986; Kofman and Lawarree, 1993; Laont and
Tirole, 1993, among others). Two exceptions are Laont's analysis of
hidden games and Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo's tax evasion model.
Laont (1988, 1990) analyzes hidden games in a principal-supervisor-
two-agents hierarchy under moral hazard. In his model the supervision
technology is perfect, that is, the supervisor always observes the agents'
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production levels. Laont assumes that the supervisor observes individ-
ual production levels while the principal observes only total production.
Accordingly, in his model, information about total production is hard
whereas the supervisor's information about individual production levels
is partially soft. That is, the supervisor can not only conceal information
but also partially lie about individual production levels. In this context,
Laont considers hidden games organized by the supervisor. The su-
pervisor can collude with one of the agents at the expense of the other.
The supervisor can also face the two agents with a prisoner-dilemma
game. A prisoner-dilemma game is a collective extortion organized by
the supervisor who threatens the two agents with permuting their mutual
production levels in his report unless they pay him a bribe. When or-
ganizing this type of hidden game, the supervisor extracts benets from
each agent by threatening to favor the other agent. Laont shows that
hidden games are deterred only when information is \highly"soft. This
contrasts with our result since we show that in a three-level hierarchy
with hard information blackmail must always be deterred. Moreover, in
Laont's model, hidden games are not deterred by raising the expected
utility of the agents but rather by using anonymous contracts. That is,
contracts which are not tied to the agent's individual production lev-
els. Therefore, unlike in our model, the hidden games organized by the
supervisor do not in ne benet the agents.
1
Accordingly, there is no
\hidden games paradox" in Laont's model. This is due to the fact that
in Laont's model information is soft. Therefore, it is impossible to de-
stroy the stake of the supervisor's hidden games by raising the expected
utility of the agents since this policy cannot prevent the supervisor from
misreporting the agent's individual performances. Aside from Laont's
hidden games, Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1996) consider also extor-
tion in a three-level hierarchy. Their model is one of tax evasion in an
adverse selection hierarchy composed of a government (the principal),
a tax inspector (the supervisor) and a tax paying citizen (the agent).
They study optimal mechanism design in a setting where the tax inspec-
tor may collude with the agent or extort her. In contrast to our paper,
the agent in their model is a tax paying citizen rather than an employee
of the organization and, is therefore not paid by the principal. Accord-
ingly, in their analysis extortion takes place between a member of the
organization (the tax inspector) and an outsider (the tax paying citizen)
rather than between two members of the same organization. Therefore,
their model concerns external extortion while ours focuses on internal
1
In Laont (1988), the two agents are compensated for the supervisor's extortion.
Their expected utilities are therefore not raised.
3
extortion.
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In order to overcome the credibility issue of the supervisor's blackmail
threat in our model, we must refer to the same exogenous mechanisms
postulated in the literature on collusion and in Laont's analysis of hid-
den games. In the literature on collusion, the agent's promise to pay a
bribe to the supervisor after the supervisor has concealed information
lacks credibility. Similarly, in Laont's hidden games model, the super-
visor cannot credibly commit to the payos dening the hidden games.
As expected, if exogenous mechanisms are not invoked, collusion and
hidden games cannot be studied in a one-shot hierarchical relationship.
Following Tirole (1986), the growing literature
3
which studies collusion
in static three-level hierarchies is based on the assumption that exoge-
nous mechanisms exist which make unocial promises credible. In order
to restore the credibility of promises in one-shot hierarchies, three ex-
ogenous mechanisms are postulated by Tirole (1986, 1992) and Laont
and Tirole (1993), namely \word-of-honor", reputation and psychology.
In his analysis of hidden games, Laont also invokes reputation to over-
come the supervisor's commitment problem. Since we consider a static
hierarchical relationship, exogenous mechanisms have to be called upon
to study blackmail. In section 4.1, we discuss how the same exogenous
mechanisms as in the cases of collusion and hidden games can be invoked
to overcome commitment issues in our three-level hierarchy.
1.2 Examples
Blackmail in hierarchies may be observed in the case of sexual harass-
ment. Legal approaches dierentiate two forms of sexual harassment at
work. The rst form is a \demand by a supervisor directed to a subordi-
nate that the subordinate grant the supervisor sexual favors in order to
obtain or keep certain job benets, be it a wage increase, a promotion, a
transfer, or the job itself" (Husbands, 1992, p. 541). This type of sexual
harassment has been labelled \quid pro quo" sexual harassment or job-
related sexual blackmail. The second form, called \hostile environment"
sexual harassment, refers to \unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors or other verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of sexual
nature which has the purpose or eect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
abusive or oensive working environment" (Husbands, 1992, p. 541).
Hostile environment sexual harassment is dierent from \quid-pro-quo"
2
Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) also consider external extortion. Their model is
one of criminal extortion by a gang.
3
For a survey of this literature, see Laont and Rochet (1997).
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harassment in that \the complainant does not have to show a tangi-
ble economic loss through being dismissed or forfeiting a promotion or
a wage increase"(Husbands,1992, p.541). Therefore, our paper is con-
cerned with \quid pro quo" sexual harassment rather than with hostile
environment sexual harassment. A comparative analysis by Husbands
(1992) of sexual harassment law in 23 industrialized countries shows that
\quid pro quo" sexual harassment is the most widespread form of sexual
harassment. Husband's analysis also shows that in many countries (the
United States and Spain for example), the employer (the principal) is
the one who is liable for damage to the victim. These denitions and
ndings support the analysis of sexual harassment in a three-level hier-
archical agency. Moreover, our assumption that exogenous devices may
sustain the credibility of the supervisor's blackmail threat is also cor-
roborated by case studies. Although in most situations the supervisor
harasser receives no monetary benets for carrying out his threat if his
subordinate refuses to give up, threats are nevertheless carried out in
many cases. For example, the Australian annual reports of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) which contain
numerous case studies of sexual harassment, report cases in which a su-
pervisor carries out his threat by denying work to a person who has
refused to give him the demanded tribute.
4
In the battle against sex-
ual harassment, many policies have been proposed and used. The most
common type of policy is monetary compensation which is given to the
victim by the employer. Another solution is to impose sanctions on the
harasser such as transfer, demotion or dismissal. However, these solu-
tions can be very costly
5
not only in actual monetary terms but also
because they tarnish the organization's reputation. In this paper, we
propose a contractual or organizational solution to the issue of sexual
harassment at work and more generally to the issue of abuse of authority
in organizations. This solution is to reduce the supervisor's authority,
that is, to destroy the sexual harassment stake. This policy has the
advantage of deterring sexual harassment and thus avoids having to go
to court or having to dismiss valuable employees. Moreover, this pol-
icy is advantageous because it prevents trauma and harm to employees
by preventing abuse of authority. In cases such as those of sexual ha-
rassment, deterring blackmail and preventing trauma and harm is more
ethical than the compensation of a victim after-the-fact. In this sense,
the \blackmail paradox" in hierarchies can be interpreted as an ethical
principle. Other opportunities of blackmail in hierarchies may take the
4
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission: Annual Report, 1989-90,
pp. 84-85.
5
Especially when the employer is liable.
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form of any type of extortion of favors (not exclusively sexual) from a
subordinate by her (or his) superior.
1.3 Related literature
1.3.1 Bureaucracy and incomplete contracts
Aside from lying within the scope of the literature which considers the
impact of varying forms of agents' unocial activities on organizational
design, this paper is also related to the growing literature on the bene-
ts of bureaucratization and rules. During the last decade, agency the-
orists have emphasized the importance of bureaucratization in reducing
the discretion of agents responsable for supervisory or managerial tasks
(Milgrom (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Tirole (1986, 1992), Laf-
font (1990), Kofman and Lawaree (1993), Prendergast and Topel (1996),
among others). Bureaucratization has been shown to be an optimal de-
vice to ght employees' unocial activities. It may require to ignore
available information such as part of that provided by the supervisor.
Bypassing available information through bureaucratization in order to
reduce employees' unocial activities may also shed new light on the
foundations of incomplete contracts. If we dene an incomplete contract
as a contract which deliberately does not use all the available informa-
tion,
6
or uses aggregate information, the need for rules may also be a
part of a theory of incomplete contracts. The usual arguments to jus-
tify the use of incomplete contracts are transaction costs, such as those
associated with bounded rationality or with writing complete contracts.
The literature on the benets of bureaucracy suggests that although
the principal can write complicated contracts, simple contracts which
deliberately ignore certain information may be more ecient to curb
employees' unocial activities.
1.3.2 Blackmail
This paper may also shed light on the dierences between blackmail
within organizations and blackmail outside organizations. Blackmail
within organizations is dierent from blackmail which occurs outside
organizational contexts such as when one person demands money from
another and promises not to reveal some information in exchange (e.g.
6
This denition of contractual incompleteness is used by Spier (1992) in a
principal-agent framework. It captures the essence of contractual simplicity. This
denition is also one among many reviewed by Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
6
one party is cheating on her (or his) spouse).
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One dierence lies in the
fact that in non-organizational contexts, blackmail may benet both the
instigator and the victim. The victim pays because his utility increases
when the information is concealed and the blackmailer's utility is ob-
viously increased when the victim pays. The second dierence lies in
the type of information manipulation. In non-organizational situations,
the blackmailer threatens to reveal the truth. That is, he threatens to
disclose some information. In contrast, in an organizational context, the
blackmailer threatens to conceal the truth. That is, he threatens to ma-
nipulate information. Finally, in an organizational context, the black-
mailer threatens to hurt the victim by concealing information from a
third party (the principal) who employs and pays both of them, whereas
in a non-organizational setting, the blackmailer threatens to hurt the
victim by disclosing information to an outside third party who is in-
volved in a relationship with only one of them. The major consequence
of these dierences is that non-organizational blackmail is deterred by
paying the blackmailer while we show that organizational blackmail is
deterred by paying the victim.
1.3.3 Exploitation in organizations
Finally, understanding blackmail and extortion in organizations can be
considered a step towards building a general theory of exploitation and
abuse of authority in organizations. Pioneering works in this domain are
Laont's analysis of hidden games and Prendergast and Topel's study
of favoritism in organizations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the model. Sections 3 and 4 characterize optimal contracts in a hierarchy
with a truthful supervisor and in a hierarchy with a venal supervisor who
blackmails the agent, respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy under moral hazard.
The top of the hierarchy (the principal) is the residual claimant of prots
generated by the whole structure. The bottom of the hierarchy (the
agent) is in charge of production. The intermediate layer (the supervisor)
is in charge of collecting information on the agent's eort level. The
7
For a complete economic analysis of blackmail outside organizational contexts,
see the May 1993 issue on blackmail of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
7
principal and the supervisor are risk neutral whereas the agent is risk
averse. The agent may or may not exert productive eort, e 2 f0; 1g.
If she exerts no eort, that is, if she shirks, she produces nothing. At
the one-eort level she produces x. Her utility function is U(w; e) =
u(w)   'e with u
0
> 0, u" < 0; where w is the monetary transfer she
receives from the principal and ' > 0 is her disutility of eort. Without
loss of generality, we assume that u(0) = 0 and u
0
(0) 6= +1.
8
Since the
principal cannot observe the agent's eort level, the role of the supervisor
is to provide a report r on this eort level. The supervisor's utility
function is V (s; a) = s a, where s is his monetary transfer and  > 0 is
his disutility of supervising eort. The supervisor has the choice between
two supervising eort levels, a 2 f0; 1g. At the zero supervising eort
level he observes nothing. We assume imperfect supervision technology,
that is, there is only a probability p that the supervisor does actually
observe the agent's eort level when he chooses a = 1. The probability p
then represents the degree of the perfection of the supervision technology.
Consequently, the supervisor's report can take three values r 2 f0; 1; ;g,
where r = ; means that the supervisor has not observed the agent's
eort. We assume that the supervisor's information is hard, that is,
veriable by the principal. Thus, the only way to manipulate information
is to conceal it. The supervisor may conceal information by reporting r =
; when he observes e = 0. In this case, he colludes with the agent. He can
also threaten to conceal information when he observes e = 1. We refer
to this form of information manipulation as blackmail and focus on this
case throughout the paper.
9
The agent's and supervisor's reservation
utilities are assumed to be u and v, respectively. According to these
assumptions, the principal's problem is to elicit the production eort
level e = 1 and the supervision eort level a = 1.
10
Assuming that
the outcome x of the hierarchy is revealed in the long run, the agent's
and the supervisor's contracts depend only on the supervisor's report
of the agent's eort level.
11
Accordingly, the principal oers a contract
8
Throughout the paper we will assume that the agent is protected by limited
liability. That is, her wage must exceed some lower limit. To simplify the analysis,
we set this limit at zero. For this reason, we must assume that u
0
(0) 6= +1.
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A complete analysis should also envision other coalitions including the one be-
tween the supervisor and the agent. However, in order to focus on blackmail, we
neglect these coalitions. Moreover, it can be shown that in this setting the supervisor-
agent and principal-supervisor coalitions (collusion) are irrelevant (Vafa (1998)).
Consequently, the blackmail-free outcome is immune from coalitions between the
supervisor and the agent and between the principal and the supervisor.
10
The outcome x is assumed to be suciently large that it is in the principal's
interest to engage in production.
11
This assumption is identical to assuming that whereas the supervisor observes
the outcome x which is revealed at the end of the period, the principal does not. The
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(w; bw;w) to the agent where w is the wage she receives when r = 0 and
bw (resp. w ) is the wage she receives when r = ; (resp. r = 1). Similarly,
the principal oers a contract (s; bs; s) to the supervisor.
Denition. The principal uses aggregate information to remunerate
the agent if she chooses to reduce the value set of the supervisor's report
by considering only the two reports r = 0 and r 6= 0.
12
Similarly,
a contract is complete (incomplete) if it species dierent (identical)
wages for each value of the supervisor's report (two dierent values of
the supervisor's report).
This denition captures the essence of contractual simplicity. Spier
(1992) uses this denition of contractual incompleteness in a principal-
agent model. She shows that asymmetric information expands the range
of contractual incompleteness. In her model, the principal oers an
incomplete contract to the agent in order to signal her type through
incompleteness. In this paper, we suggest another explanation for the
expansion of contractual incompleteness. We show that it is the ex-
istence of abuse of authority which expands the range of contractual
incompleteness.
It is important to note that, in the case of collusion, it is not relevant
to know whether it is the supervisor who threatens the agent with reveal-
ing the truth or the agent who asks the supervisor to conceal the truth.
This is due to the fact that when the agent shirks and her eort level is
observed by the supervisor, forming a coalition to conceal the truth is
mutually advantageous. Collusion is therefore an agreement between a
dishonest agent (a shirker) and a dishonest supervisor (a supervisor who
accepts bribes). Accordingly, since collusion is mutually benecial, the
supervisor does not take advantage of his authority when colluding with
the agent. In contrast, blackmail involves an honest agent (an agent
who works and who wants the supervisor to accurately report her eort
level) and a dishonest supervisor (a supervisor who demands a tribute
to reveal the truth). Therefore, blackmail is an abuse of authority.
The timing of the game is as follows
Insert Figure
At the rst stage, the principal oers a contract (w; bw;w) to the
agent and a contract (s; bs; s) to the supervisor. The agent and the su-
supervisor then makes a report on the outcome.
12
Laont (1990) uses the term aggregate information in a dierent meaning. In his
three-level pyramidal hierarchy with two agents, the supervisor can provide informa-
tion on total production level as well as on individual production levels. Aggregate
information then refers to information on total production level.
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pervisor decide whether to accept or refuse the contract. If one of them
refuses, the game ends and they both receive their reservation utility.
At stage two, the agent and the supervisor play a simultaneous move
game. The agent chooses whether to work or to shirk. The supervisor
chooses whether to supervise or not. If the supervisor decides to su-
pervise, the imperfect supervision technology reveals the agent's eort
level with probability p. At the third stage, if the supervision technol-
ogy reveals that the agent works, the supervisor takes advantage of his
authority by blackmailing the agent. He threatens the agent with an
uninformative report (r = ;) unless the agent pays him a tribute. The
agent accepts or refuses to pay the demanded tribute. At the fourth
stage, the supervisor produces a report for the principal. At stage 5, the
parties exchange transfers according to the contractual agreements. At
the last stage, the agent and the supervisor exchange a side-transfer (trib-
ute) according to their side-agreement. We look for a Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium of this game, and we restrict attention on pure strategies.
Throughout this paper we will consider the collusion model and its
main results as a comparison benchmark for our analysis. For this pur-
pose, we adopt the major assumptions of the canonical collusion model.
That is, we assume that blackmail takes place after the supervisor has
observed the agent's eort. Furthermore, we assume that the risk-neutral
supervisor has all the bargaining power in the unocial subgame with
the agent and that he is protected by limited liability. Therefore, the
principal must give the supervisor a rent for his information. Finally,
we assume that a mechanism exists which makes unocial promises be-
tween the supervisor and the agent credible. In our setting, this last
assumption means that there is a mechanism which makes the agent's
promise to pay a tribute to the supervisor after he has reported the
truth credible. In section 4.1 we show that this last assumption must be
extended in order to account for the supervisor's blackmail threat.
We will rst turn to the characterization of contracts when the su-
pervisor reports truthfully.
3 A truthful supervisor
In this section we analyze the benchmark case in which the supervisor
is truthful and does not take advantage of his authority by blackmailing
the agent. Therefore, the third stage of the game is removed. Given
the imperfect supervision technology, the principal wishes to elicit the
production eort level e = 1. Thus, the agent's participation and no-
10
shirking constraints are respectively,
pu(w) + (1  p)u( bw)  '  u (1)
pu(w) + (1  p)u( bw)  '  pu(w) + (1  p)u( bw) that is,
p(u(w)  u(w))  '  0 (2)
Similarly, the principal wishes to elicit the supervision eort level
a = 1. Accordingly, the supervisor's participation and no-shirking con-
straints are respectively,
ps+ (1  p)bs    v (3)
ps+ (1  p)bs    bs that is, p(s  bs)   0 (4)
Equations (1) and (3) state that the agent and the supervisor must
obtain at least their reservation utility. Equations (2) and (4) are the
agent's and supervisor's no-shirking constraints, making them weakly
prefer to exert eort in equilibrium.
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It is important to note that in our setting, w and s are never paid
since the principal wishes to elicit the production eort level e = 1 and
the supervision eort level a = 1. However, w and s are used to elicit
the equilibrium production eort level e = 1. Formally, to elicit e = 1,
the principal must also provide incentives to the supervisor to report the
truth when he observes e = 0. That is, we also have to consider the
supervisor's participation and no-shirking constraints for e = 0,
ps+ (1  p)bs    v (5)
ps+ (1  p)bs    bs that is, p(s  bs)   0 (6)
We assume that the agent and the supervisor are protected by limited
liability. This requires that their wage exceeds a lower limit. Without
loss of generality, we set this limit at zero. Therefore,
w  0; bw  0; w  0; s  0; bs  0; s  0 (7)
Given our assumptions the principal's program reduces to a cost min-
imization subjected to the supervisor and the agent participating and
supplying full eort, that is,
13
We assume that when the agent is indierent between working and shirking (resp.
when the supervisor is indierent between supervising or not), she (he) behaves in
the way the principal wants her (him) to. That is, she chooses to work (resp. he
chooses to supervise).
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[P
0
] min p(w + s) + (1  p)( bw + bs)
(w; bw;w); (s; bs; s)
s.t. (1); (2); (3); (4), (5); (6) and (7)
The optimal solution to this program is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 :
(i) There exists ep, such that the principal uses (oers) aggregate in-
formation (an incomplete contract to the agent) i p  ep.
(ii) For p  ep, the agent's contract is characterized by 0  w 
u
 1
('+ u 
'
p
) and bw = w = u
 1
(u+ ').
(iii) For p < ep, the agent's contract is characterized by w = 0,
bw = u
 1
(
u
1  p
) and w = u
 1
(
'
p
).
(iv) The principal keeps the supervisor at his reservation utility level.
Proof. see Appendix
When the supervision technology is weakly imperfect, that is, when
the agent's eort may be observed with a high probability, the princi-
pal can elicit full production eort by giving a at wage schedule to the
agent whether r = 1 or r = ;. The principal then uses aggregate in-
formation, that is, she does not use all the information available from
the supervisor's report to pay the agent. Since w is never paid at equi-
librium, the agent is \fully" insured in this case. In contrast, when the
supervision technology is highly imperfect, that is, when the probabil-
ity that the supervisor observes the agent's eort level is under some
treshold value, the principal uses all the information available from the
supervisor's report. The intuition behind this is that, since the proba-
bility of observing the agent's eort level is low, the incentive problem
of the agent is exacerbated. She has less incentive to work and more
incentive to shirk (since working and shirking have a small probability
to be detected). In order to give incentives to the agent to motivate her
to work, the optimal policy for the principal is then to oer a riskier
wage schedule to the agent. This is done by creating a strong gap be-
tween contingent wages. Indexing the contingent wages connected with
the p < ep case by  and those connected with the p  ep case by o, one
has w

 w
o
< bw

< bw
o
= w
o
< w

for p < ep.
As for the supervisor, his participation constraint is binding. That is,
he is set to his individual rationality level. His contract is such that s > bs,
otherwise he will not exert any supervisory eort and, consequently,
an agency relationship will not be possible. Similarly, we have s > bs;
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otherwise the supervisor will not report truthfully when he observes
e = 0.
We now turn to the case of a venal supervisor who takes advantage
of his authority by blackmailing the agent.
4 A venal supervisor
4.1 Unocial threats and promises in hierarchies
Among the strong assumptions on which the literature based on Tirole
(1986) has been erected, the most crucial one is that side-agreements
between the supervisor and the agent are binding in the collusion sub-
game. This means that it is credibly possible to commit to a promise
14
in
an unocial one-shot relationship. Formally, once the supervisor has re-
ported in accordance with the side-agreement, the agent no longer has an
incentive to pay the promised bribe, but she nevertheless stands by her
promise and pays the supervisor.
15
In order to overcome this credibility
issue, the literature on collusion appeals to exogenous mechanisms. Ti-
role (1992) and Laont and Tirole (1993) invoke three exogenous mech-
anisms which may sustain promises in a static collusive side-agreement.
The rst mechanism is \word-of-honor". The parties to the side-contract
pledge their word and loathe to cheat on promises with other parties.
The second mechanism is reputation. It is assumed that the relationship
is an ongoing one and therefore, the parties are concerned about their
reputation of being able to abide to their promise in order to increase
their payos. That is, the agent and the supervisor are concerned about
their reputation of being trustworthy and fair. According to this argu-
ment, the binding promise framework is a short-cut to a dynamic theory
relying on reputation considerations.
16
The third mechanism is psychol-
ogy or emotions. Tirole (1992, pp. 155-156) suggests that one party will
keep her promise worrying \that the other party would be upset by the
breach of agreements and would seek revenge". Similarly, in Laont's
static analysis of hidden games, the supervisor's commitment to the pay-
os dening the hidden games may lack credibility. Laont also invokes
reputation to overcome the supervisor's commitment problem. In other
words, collusion and hidden games models implicitly assume that a pro-
14
For a discussion of denitions of threat and promise, see Klein and O'Flaherty
(1993).
15
This approach is termed enforceability approach in contrast to the self-
enforceability approach. For a complete analysis of these issues and for examples,
see Tirole (1992).
16
See Tirole (1992) for the rst formal treatment of self-enforcing side-agreements.
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hibitive cost exists (which is exogenous in the models) due to the loss of
one's reputation or honor. This assumption makes the agent's strategy
not to honor her promise in collusion models and the supervisor's strat-
egy not to abide to the payos dening the hidden games in Laont's
analysis dominated strategies. As in the cases of collusion and hidden
games, in the analysis of blackmail we must consider the credibility of
the agent's promise to pay the supervisor after he has reported r = 1 as
well as the credibility of the supervisor's threat to report r = ; unless
the agent pays him a tribute. In our model, when the supervisor ob-
serves that the agent works, he threatens to conceal this information if
the agent does not pay him a tribute. This threat, as well as the agent's
promise of paying a tribute to the supervisor after he has reported the
truth, lacks credibility. When the supervisor threatens the agent with
an uninformative report and the agent refuses to comply, the supervisor
gains s   if he does not carry out his threat and bs   otherwise. Since
the principal must elicit the supervision eort level a = 1, we have s > bs.
Therefore, it is not in the supervisor's interest to carry out his threat.
However, in the case of sexual harassment, previous reports
17
have em-
phasized that the supervisor harasser often carries out his threat and
harms his \non-cooperative" subordinate. The supervisor may do this
even if it is not in his immediate monetary interest to do so. Therefore,
there are long term monetary gains and costs as well as non-monetary
gains and costs related to carrying out one's threat. In our setting, the
supervisor's threat becomes credible if we rely on the same exogenous
mechanisms as those suggested in collusion and hidden games models.
These models implicitly assume that the agent incurs a prohibitive ex-
ogenous cost when she does not keep her promise toward the supervisor
(collusion models) and that the supervisor incurs a prohibitive cost when
he does not abide to the payos dening the hidden games (hidden games
models). In order to analyze blackmail in a static hierarchy, we can sim-
ilarly call upon reputation to overcome the commitment problem of the
supervisor. We can assume that the hierarchical relationship is ongoing
and, therefore, the supervisor's opportunity to benet from blackmail in
the future depends on his reputation for carrying out his threats. As
in the case of collusion, our assumption that the supervisor can credi-
bly commit to carrying out his threat is then a short-cut to a dynamic
theory relying on reputation considerations. However, in contrast to the
collusion and hidden games cases, in the blackmail case the supervisor
is the only one who is concerned about his reputation. Moreover, he is
17
For instance the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission:
Annual Report, 1989-90, pp. 84-85.
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not concerned about his reputation of being trustworthy but instead of
being vindictive and agressive. That is, the supervisor wants the agent
to know that he is capable of punishing her if she does not comply or if
she does not keep her promise. Aside from reputational concerns, emo-
tions or psychology can also overcome the credibility issue of commit-
ments. In our setting, this can be done by assuming that the supervisor
makes a belief-independent or belief-dependent emotional response to
the agent's strategy to refuse to pay a tribute. Belief-independent emo-
tional response refers to exogenous emotional response in games, that is,
an emotional response which is always the same for a given outcome. In
contrast, belief-dependent emotional response refers to an emotional re-
sponse which diers depending on the parties' beliefs at dierent times.
18
Considering belief-independent emotional response in our setting means
that there is a prohibitive psychological or emotional cost for the super-
visor to not carry out his threat. This cost may be due to frustration and
anger caused by not seeking revenge, that is, by letting the agent goes
unpunished for her act of bravado.
19
Thus, the agent will accept to pay
a tribute at the blackmail stage of the game (stage 3) because she knows
that the supervisor will otherwise seek revenge by reporting r = ;. Simi-
larly, the agent will make the promised side-transfer after the supervisor
has made his report (stage 6) because she knows that the supervisor will
otherwise take his revenge by harming her. Thus, threats and promises
are now credible due to the commonly known aggressive psychological
prole of the supervisor. It is important to note that the psychological
or emotional paradigm can be viewed as an extreme case of a reputation
model in which the prior probability of the supervisor being aggressive is
equal to one. Emotions and psychology are appealing exogenous mech-
anisms which sustain threats and promises, especially in cases such as
those of sexual harassment or more generally those involving extortion
of favors. This is the case since these situations involve strong feelings
18
Games considering belief-dependent emotional responses are termed psychologi-
cal games. For belief-independant emotional responses in games see Frank (1988) or
Huang and Wu (1992), and for a complete denition and description of psychological
games see Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989).
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Elster (1996, p. 1392) writes:\...we may observe that emotions contribute to
welfare in several ways. First, in any given encounter with the world there may
arise occurrent emotions that are immediate sources of happiness and unhappiness.
Secondly, emotional dispositions may shape the outcome of any such encounter. If
people know that I am subject to ts of destructive anger, I will usually get my
way when I deal with them. Thirdly, the dispositions tend to shape the stream of
such encounters. If people know that I am irascible, they will avoid dealing with me.
Fourth, if I control my anger to prevent such eects, I incur psychological costs that
may be quite severe. Suppression of spontaneous emotional experiences and action
tendencies may have a large negative impact on soma and psyche".(our emphasis)
15
(such as those related, for instance, to sexual attraction) as well as social,
moral and professional stakes. Aside from Tirole (1992), authors such
as Hirshleifer (1987), Frank (1987, 1988) and Huang and Wu (1992) as
well as others have considered severe emotional gains and costs as de-
vices which make commitments credible in one-shot interactions. These
authors show how non-material gains and costs such as those related to
joy, anger or frustration may oset material incentives so as to make
some behaviors credible. For example, Huang and Wu (1992) consider
both belief-independent and belief-dependent emotional responses in lit-
igation. They rst show that without emotional responses, the threat to
go trial by a defendant is not credible. Then they show that both types
of emotional responses make this threat credible. To summarize this sec-
tion, reputation as well as emotions are devices which make threats and
promises credible in one-shot unocial relationships in organizations.
We will now turn to the analysis of the blackmail subgame.
4.2 Blackmail
When the agent decides to work and her eort level is observed by the
supervisor, she is blackmailed by him. The supervisor then threatens
to report r = ;. It may be in the agent's interest to pay the tribute
demanded by the supervisor to prevent information concealment. In
accordance with Tirole (1992), we assume that side-transfers between
the agent and the supervisor are made at a rate k 2 (0; 1) which is
proportional to the size of the tribute. That is, if the agent transfers
t, the supervisor receives kt. This assumption means that the transfer
technology between the agent and the supervisor is not totally ecient.
This may be, for example, because it is costly to organize unocial ac-
tivities in organizations. Since we assume that an exogenous mechanism
exists which makes threats and promises credible in unocial subgames,
s+ kt
min
   and s   represent the supervisor's payos corresponding
respectively to blackmailing or not the agent. The minimum monetary
tribute t
min
claimed by the supervisor to report the truth is then solution
to s+ kt
min
    s   , that is, t
min
 0. Thus, it is in the supervisor's
interest to blackmail the agent as long as t
min
 0. The agent accepts
to pay the demanded tribute if u(w   t
max
)   '  u( bw)   ', that is,
if t
max
 w   bw where t
max
is the maximum monetary tribute that the
agent who does not shirk is ready to pay to the supervisor so that he
will report the truth. If we consider the amount of the blackmail trib-
ute transferred by the agent to the supervisor as the solution of a Nash
bargaining game between the supervisor and the agent, this amount will
be determined by their respective bargaining powers. Following Tirole
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(1986), we assume that the supervisor has all the bargaining power. The
supervisor then proposes a take-it-or-leave-it oer t to the agent. Since
the agent is ready to pay the maximum amount of t
max
= w   bw and
the supervisor is always better o blackmailing the agent than not, the
blackmail tribute related to the case in which the agent does not shirk
and the supervisor observes her eort is t = w   bw.
Note that the fact that it is in the supervisor's interest to blackmail
the agent as long as t
min
 0 is independent of the respective bargaining
powers. Even if the supervisor does not not have all the bargaining
power, it is still benecial for him to blackmail the agent as long as
t
min
 0. Therefore, we show that it is impossible to deter blackmail
through the supervisor's contract by giving him incentives. Blackmail
deterrence can only be carried out through the contract oered to the
agent.
We now turn to the determination of the expressions of the partici-
pation and no-shirking constraints.
The agent's participation and no-shirking constraints are respectively,
pu(w   t) + (1  p)u( bw)  '  u that is,
u( bw)  '  u  0 (8)
pu(w   t) + (1  p)u( bw)  '  pu(w) + (1  p)u( bw) that is,
p(u( bw)  u(w))  '  0 (9)
The supervisor's participation and no-shirking constraints are respec-
tively,
p(s+ k(w   bw)) + (1  p)bs    v that is,
p(s  bs) + bs+ pk(w   bw)     v  0 (10)
p(s+ k(w   bw)) + (1  p)bs    bs that is,
p(s  bs) + pk(w   bw)    0 (11)
We also have to consider the supervisor's participation and no-shirking
constraints for e = 0 as well as the limited liability constraints. There-
fore, we add constraints (5), (6) and (7) to the previous constraints.
The supervisor is better o blackmailing the agent as long as t =
w   bw  0. Accordingly, if w < bw, since the tribute t is then negative,
the supervisor will not blackmail the agent. However, as we showed,
the resulting program (program [P
0
] with w < bw ) does not have any
solution. We must therefore necessarily have w  bw. Consequently,
when the supervisor is venal and takes advantage of his authority by
17
blackmailing the agent, the principal faces a new constraint,
w   bw  0 (12)
Under our assumptions the principal's program can be written as
[P
1
] min p(w + s) + (1  p)( bw + bs)
(w; bw;w); (s; bs; s)
s.t. (5), (6); (7); (8),(9); (10), (11) and (12)
The solution to this program is summarized in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 :
(i) The optimal policy for the principal is to deter abuse of authority.
(ii) The principal always uses (oers) aggregate information (an in-
complete contract to the agent).
(iii) When the supervision technology is weakly imperfect (i.e. p 
ep):
a. the agent's contract is characterized by 0  w  u
 1
(' + u 
'
p
)
and bw = w = u
 1
(u+ ').
b. the existence of abuse of authority does not aect the eciency of
the organization.
(iv) When the supervision technology is highly imperfect (i.e. p <
ep):
a. the agent's contract is characterized by w = 0 and bw = w =
u
 1
(
'
p
):
b. the existence of abuse of authority decreases the eciency of the
organization.
(v) The principal keeps the supervisor at his reservation utility level.
Proof. see Appendix
We therefore have
Corollary.
The existence of abuse of authority in hierarchies has the following
consequences:
1. It expands the range of contractual incompleteness.
2. It benets in ne the victim (the agent) and not the instigator (the
supervisor).
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As in the truthful supervisor case, the supervisor's participation con-
straint is saturated. Since bw = w the supervisor's contract is unchanged.
The principal oers the supervisor the same contract whether he is as-
sumed to be truthful or venal and engaging in blackmail. As estab-
lished in the truthful supervisor case, when the supervision technology
is weakly imperfect, the principal uses aggregate information to remu-
nerate the agent. In this case, blackmail cannot occur because there is
no stake for it. Accordingly, blackmail is deterred at no cost and has no
impact on contracts. In contrast, the agent's contract is no longer the
same when the supervision technology is highly imperfect and blackmail
occurs. In this case, giving incentives to the agent to make her work has
a higher cost than when the supervisor is truthful. That is, the agent's
no-shirking constraint becomes more costly to fulll. This is due to the
fact that if the agent decides to work she has a low probability that her
eort level will be observed and, in case of control, the supervisor black-
mails her. Allowing abuse of authority has therefore a higher cost than
deterring it. Consequently, when the supervision technology is highly
imperfect and the supervisor is venal and blackmails the agent, the prin-
cipal deters abuse of authority. He does so by increasing the agent's
contingent wage bw so that bw = w. The principal then gives a at wage
w to the agent whether r = ; or r = 1. Accordingly, the existence
of abuse of authority in hierarchies expands the range of contractual in-
completeness. Since the supervisor can therefore no longer blackmail the
agent, using (oering) aggregate information (an incomplete contract to
the agent) deters abuse of authority. This policy implies that the agent's
expected utility increases when the supervisor is venal and that she is
\fully" insured even when p < ep. The agent is then the one who ben-
ets from the supervisor's blackmail activity. Thus, although blackmail
is originally organized to the detriment of the agent and indirectly to
the detriment of the principal, it is the agent who nally captures the
informational rent attached to the supervisor's blackmail by enjoying a
uniform wage associated with both r = 1 and r 6= ; reports. That is, the
agent receives a at wage when r 6= 0. When the supervision technology
is highly imperfect and the supervisor is truthful (resp. venal), the cost
of the three-level hierarchy is C
t
=  + v+ pu
 1
(
'
p
) + (1  p)u
 1
(
u
1  p
)
(resp. C
v
=  + v + u
 1
(
'
p
)). Therefore, when p < ep, the eect of
the supervisor's abuse of authority on the principal's welfare is given by
C
v
 C
t
= (1 p)(u
 1
(
'
p
) u
 1
(
u
1  p
))> 0. That is, when the supervision
technology is highly imperfect, the existence of abuse of authority de-
creases the eciency of the organization. Although the model developed
here is a moral hazard one, it is interesting to compare the optimal policy
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which deters blackmail in this setting with the one which deters collusion
in adverse selection models.
20
In the adverse selection literature on collu-
sion, the principal has the choice between two policies to deter collusion.
The rst policy is to create incentive payments for the supervisor and
the second is to destroy the agent's stake in collusion. In Tirole's (1992)
terminology, these policies are termed incentive policy and bureaucratic
policy, respectively. The principal's choice is then conditioned by the
unocial transfer rate k 2 (0; 1). When k is smaller than a threshold
value, incentive policy becomes optimal.
21
Incentive policy operates by
inducing the supervisor to report truthfully. That is, if we refer to the
stake of collusion as the informational rent which is kept by the agent
when the supervisor hides the truth, the payment to the supervisor must
exceed this stake discounted by the transaction cost of collusion. If we
assume that the supervisor has all the bargaining power in the collusion
subgame, the collusion rent is then captured by the supervisor. On the
other hand, bureaucratic policy works by eliminating the supervisor's
discretion or, similarly, by destroying the agent's stake in any collusion
with the supervisor. This policy implies lower levels of rent (than in the
case without collusion) for the agent in order to reduce the possibility
that he will corrupt the supervisor. That is, collusion threat may nally
reduce the agent's expected utility. Thus, whenever collusion threat is
benecial to someone, it is usually to the supervisor, that is, to one of
the collusion instigators. This conclusion is intuitive since collusion in
hierarchies is a mutually advantageous coalition between two employees.
In contrast to collusion, blackmail in hierarchies is an abuse of authority
and thus is not mutually advantageous. Therefore, the main result of our
analysis, that the possibility of blackmail in hierarchies only benets the
victim and not the instigator, is striking. We refer to this phenomenon
as the \blackmail paradox" in organizations. It can be explained in the
following way. Unlike collusion, blackmail cannot be deterred by making
a payment to the supervisor which exceeds the stake of blackmail. That
is, blackmail cannot be deterred by raising the supervisor's contingent
wage, since blackmail is always benecial to the supervisor. Thus, the
only way to deter blackmail is through the agent's contract. The prin-
cipal must then use aggregate information. She must pay the agent the
same wage whether the supervisor reports r 6= ; or r = 1. That is, she
oers a at wage to the agent when r 6= 0. This policy destroys the su-
pervisor's stake in any blackmail activity. When she oers the contract
bw = w = w = u
 1
(
'
p
), the principal deters blackmail ex ante since the
20
Collusion has been considered mainly in adverse selection environments. Excep-
tions are Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991, 1998).
21
For a survey and complete discussion of these issues, see Tirole (1992).
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supervisor can no longer blackmail the agent due to the fact that report-
ing r 6= ; or r = 1 results in the same wage being given to the agent.
Thus, in the case of blackmail, the incentive policy is ineective. To
deter blackmail, the principal must reduce the supervisor's discretion.
Accordingly, in this setting and for any k 2 (0; 1), a bureaucratic policy
is the only one that deters blackmail. This conclusion may shed new
light on the issue of sexual harassment at work. When blackmail takes
the form of sexual harassment, it is ethically reprehensible. Thus, pre-
venting abuse of authority by introducing more rules in organizations
may also have an ethical dimension. Bureaucracy may therefore have
ethical virtues at times.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy under moral hazard
where contracts are contingent only on the supervisor's report on the
agent's eort level. The imperfection of the supervision technology al-
lows for information manipulation by the supervisor. We focused on one
form of information manipulation, namely blackmail, which has been
ignored until very recently. In contrast to the existing literature on
extortion and blackmail, we focused on internal blackmail. Unlike collu-
sion, blackmail in hierarchies occurs when the supervisor's information
is favorable to the agent. The supervisor then threatens the agent with
concealing the truth. We showed that the optimal policy for the principal
is to deter blackmail. We found that, paradoxically, blackmail in hierar-
chies benets in ne the victim (the agent) rather than the supervisor.
This is due to the fact that, in contrast to collusion, deterring blackmail
can only be done through destroying its stake. This is done by raising
the agent's contingent wage in the case of an uninformative report and
paying her a at wage whether the supervisor's report is favorable to the
agent or whether it contains no information. Our analysis also revealed
that the expansion of the range of contractual incompleteness may be
the consequence of the existence of abuse of authority in hierarchies.
21
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
The program [P
0
] has the Lagrangian:
L = p(w + s) + (1   p)( bw + bs)   
1
[pu(w) + (1   p)u( bw)   '   u] 

2
[p(u(w) u(w)) '] 
3
[ps+(1 p)bs  v] 
4
[p(s bs) ] 
5
[ps+
(1 p)bs   v] 
6
[p(s bs) ] 
7
w 
8
bw 
9
w 
10
s 
11
bs 
12
s
where 
i
, i = 1; ::; 12 are non-negative multipliers.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this concave minimization program
are:
L/w = 
2
pu
0
(w)  
7
= 0 (13)
L/ bw = (1  p)(1  
1
u
0
( bw))  
8
= 0 (14)
L/w = p(1  (
1
+ 
2
)u
0
(w))  
9
= 0 (15)
L/s =  p(
5
+ 
6
)  
10
= 0 (16)
L/bs = (1  p)(1  
3
  
5
) + p(
4
+ 
6
)  
11
= 0 (17)
L/s = p(1  
3
  
4
)  
12
= 0 (18)
plus the constraints and their complementary slackness conditions.
From the supervisor's no-shirking constraint p(s   bs)     0, one
has s > 0 and accordingly, 
12
= 0. One then has 
3
= 1   
4
from
Eq. (18). From Eq. (16), one has 
5
= 
6
= 
10
= 0. Therefore,
substituting 
3
= 1 
4
into Eq. (17) leads to 
4
= 
11
. One possibility
is then that 
4
= 
11
= 0 and bs = 0. It follows that 
3
= 1; that
is, the supervisor's participation constraint ps + (1   p)bs      v  0
is binding and therefore s =
+v
p
. Similarly, from 
5
= 
6
= 
10
= 0
and bs = 0; one has s =
+v
p
: From the agent's no-shirking constraint,
on has w > 0 and therefore 
9
= 0. From Eq. (13), there are two
possibilities to be distinguished: (i) 
7
> 0, that is, 
2
> 0; (ii) 
7
= 0,
that is, 
2
= 0. If (i) 
7
> 0 and thus 
2
> 0 and w = 0, one has

1
+ 
2
=
1
u
0
(w)
and 
8
= (1   p)(1   
1
u
0
( bw))  0 from Eqs. (14)
and (15). Consider 3 possible cases: (a) 
1
= 0; (b) 
1
2 (0;
1
u
0
(bw)
); (c)

1
=
1
u
0
(bw)
: Cases (a) and (b) imply 
8
> 0 and therefore bw = 0. Case
(a) yields a contradiction since one then has u(w) 
'+u
p
and u(w) =
'
p
:
Similarly, case (b) yields a contradiction since one has u(w) =
'+u
p
and
u(w) =
'
p
. Case (c) implies 
8
= 0 and therefore bw  0. In this case 
2
=
h
1
u
0
(w)
 
1
u
0
(bw)
i
> 0. That is, w > bw. bw = 0 yields a contradiction since
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one then has u(w) =
'+u
p
and u(w) =
'
p
: Accordingly, in case (c), one
necessarily has bw > 0. Furthermore, in this case, the agent's no-shirking
and participation constraints are binding and one has bw = u
 1
(
u
1  p
)
and w = u
 1
(
'
p
). Since one must have w > bw, this contract is only
feasible if p < ep =
'
'+u
. If (ii) 
7
= 0 and thus 
2
= 0 and w  0, one
has 
1
=
1
pu
0
(w)
and 
8
= (1   p)(1  
1
u
0
( bw))  0 from Eqs. (14) and
(15). Consider 2 possible cases: (a) 
1
2 (0;
1
u
0
(bw)
); (b) 
1
=
1
u
0
(bw)
: Case
(a) implies 
8
> 0 and therefore bw = 0. This case yields a contradiction
since one then has 
1
=
1
pu
0
(w)
<
1
pu
0
(0)
. Case (b) implies 
8
= 0 and
accordingly, bw  0. bw = 0 yields a contradiction since one then has 
1
=
1
pu
0
(w)
=
1
pu
0
(0)
: In this case one necessarily has bw > 0 and therefore 
1
=
1
pu
0
(w)
=
1
pu
0
(bw)
. It follows that bw = w. Then, from the agent's binding
participation constraint one has w = bw = w = u
 1
(' + u). Since the
agent's no-shirking constraint requires 0  u(w)  u(w) 
'
p
= '+u 
'
p
,
one must also have '+ u 
'
p
 0: This contract is then only feasible if
p  ep.
Proof of proposition 2.
The program [P
1
] has the Lagrangian:
L = p(w+s)+(1 p)( bw+bs) 
1
[u( bw) ' u] 
2
[p(u( bw) u(w)) '] 

3
[p(s  bs) + bs+ pk(w  bw)     v] 
4
[p(s  bs) + pk(w  bw)   ] 

5
[ps+ (1  p)bs     v]  
6
[p(s  bs)  ]  
7
w  
8
bw  
9
w  
10
s 

11
bs  
12
s  
13
[w   bw]
where 
i
, i = 1; ::; 13 are non-negative multipliers.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this concave minimization program
are:
L/w = 
2
pu
0
(w)  
7
= 0 (19)
L/ bw = (1  p)  
1
u
0
( bw)  p[
2
u
0
( bw)  k(
3
+ 
4
)]
 
8
+ 
13
= 0 (20)
L/w = p(1  k(
3
+ 
4
))  
9
  
13
= 0 (21)
L/s =  p(
5
+ 
6
)  
10
= 0 (22)
L/bs = (1  p)(1  
3
  
5
) + p(
4
+ 
6
)  
11
= 0 (23)
L/s = p(1  
3
  
4
)  
12
= 0 (24)
plus the constraints and their complementary slackness conditions.
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From Eq. (22), one has 
5
= 
6
= 
10
= 0: One also has bw > 0 and
w > 0 from the agent's participation and no-shirking constraints and
from the constraint w  bw. Therefore, 
8
= 
9
= 0 and Eq. (21) can be
rewritten as 
13
= p(1  k(
3
+ 
4
)). Since 
3
+ 
4
 1 from Eq. (24)
and k < 1, one has 
13
> 0; that is, bw = w = w. From the supervisor's
no-shirking constraint p(s   bs)     0 one has s > 0 that is, 
12
= 0.
One then has 
3
= 1  
4
from Eq. (24). Substituting 
3
= 1  
4
into
Eq. (23) leads to 
4
= 
11
. One possibility is then that 
4
= 
11
= 0
and bs = 0. It follows that 
3
= 1; that is, the supervisor's participation
constraint is binding and s =
+v
p
. Similarly, from 
5
= 
6
= 
10
= 0
and bs = 0; one has s =
+v
p
. From Eq. (19), two cases are to be
distinguished: (i) 
7
> 0, that is, 
2
> 0; (ii) 
7
= 0, that is, 
2
= 0. If
(i) 
7
> 0 and thus 
2
> 0 and w = 0, one has 
1
+ p
2
=
1
u
0
(w)
from
Eqs. (20) and (21). From the agent's binding no-shirking constraint, one
has w = u
 1
(
'
p
). As one must have 
1
 0, the agent's participation
constraint requires u(w)  '+ u, that is,
'
p
  ' + u  0: This contract
is then only feasible if p  ep. If (ii) 
7
= 0 and thus 
2
= 0 and w  0,
one has 
1
=
1
u
0
(w)
from Eqs. (20) and (21). From the agent's binding
participation constraint, one has w = u
 1
(' + u). Since the agent's
no-shirking constraint requires 0  u(w)  u(w)  
'
p
= '+ u 
'
p
, this
contract is then only feasible if p  ep.
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